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CAN NATO DEFEND 
THE ENVIRONMENT? 
By Charles F. Doran* 
On April 10, 1969, President Nixon urged NATO to acquire a 
new "third dimension" devoted to improvement of the global 
environment.! A Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
(CCMS) was established to administer the environmental effort. 
Under the auspices of CCMS, six states meeting in Ankara in 1970 
organized a study of air pollution in Ankara and Frankfurt to 
assess techniques for controlling sulfur oxides and particulate mat-
ter. In one project, the United States and Italy examined disaster 
relief programs, preparedness activities, and scientific advances in 
relief assistance. Another project sought new means to cope with 
oil spills and new methods of coordinating national clean-up efforts. 
West Germany led a study probing ways to implement the research 
findings of the sub-committees, to translate scientific knowledge 
into political action, and to synchronize national and international 
planning. 
In light of these activities, the choice of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization as the initial international agency to receive 
United States backing in the fight against pollution seems, at first 
glance, quite plausible. 
STRUCTURAL CREDITS 
Fashioned after military command structure, NATO's admin-
istrative procedure is reliable, if comparatively austere. In the wake 
of the Korean conflict and the Cold War, the United States govern-
ment increasingly centralized military and political coordination 
within the NATO Council. Despite widespread, legitimate dis-
paragement of the North Atlantic Council as a "decision-ratifier" 
and "clearing house for individual national aspirations and anxi-
eties," the Council is active and responsive by the standards of most 
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international organizations.2 At the very least, it avoids getting in 
the way of decisions agreed upon by the principal members and 
it provides a milieu in which the United States can sometimes rep-
resent the interests of the smaller states against the demands of the 
more powerful. 
Following reorganization in 1951, which increased the status of 
the Council of Deputies and made it a permanent working adjunct 
of the larger Council, and following the creation of integrated mili-
tary staffs within the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) 
in the same year, NATO rapidly became the most durable and 
institutionalized alliance since the European Concert of the post-
Napoleonic years.s Further centralization occurred at the Lisbon 
Conference in 1952, and in the Paris agreements of 1954 (re-
affirmed at the Defense Ministers' Conference in 1958) facilitating 
the accession of West Germany in 1955. Even the stormy with-
drawal of French forces from the Organization in June of 1966 may 
have fostered tighter integration: the transferral of the important 
Military Committee from Washington to Brussels allegedly led to 
improved consultation between the military and civilian spheres 
of NATO. So much institutional vitality undoubtedly appealed to 
the architects of Washington's new environmental policies. 
The Organization is expeditious, especially at the lower decision 
levels, in handling complex policy issues with adequate, not ex-
cessive deliberation. This efficiency stems from the skillful exploita-
tion of two considerations-the existence of an elaborate committee 
system and insistence on unanimity rule-that would normally be 
expected to lead to delay, obstruction, and attrition of the ability 
to carry out whatever decisions might emerge. Over 290 committees 
practice a division of labor which channels and delineates security 
matters, economic and cultural relations, budgets, research, indus-
trial and manpower planning, medical care and civil defense in an 
ordered hierarchy. Normally administered by a chairman and a 
secretary, these committees often form "nests" of closely affiliated 
groups working on common problems such as infrastructure and 
pipelines or civil emergency planning, thus preserving flexibility 
without sacrificing specialization. Second, since all decision-making 
within NATO follows the unanimity principle, compromise-
often too much compromise-is accentuated, while the will of the 
leadership finds easy acceptance through a manipulation of issues 
under discussion, an appealing prospect for the ecologists. But 
unanimity has been relatively easy to maintain because, as Herbert 
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Dinerstein points out, NATO's goals, traditionally conceived, have 
been "modest," limited to preventing the spread of Soviet influence 
in Europe. 4 If NATO's goals were broadened to provide W es tern 
Europe with a common economic policy or a general environmental 
program, the unanimity principle could become as self-defeating 
as it was in the 1962 EEC agricultural negotiations. These new 
areas of concern encompass far more subjects for policy conflict 
and disagreement than the relatively restricted military issues 
which NATO staffs and committees have learned to manage. 
If a government's environmental concern and its financial capac-
ity to eliminate pollution are the principal factors which ought to 
correlate with its relative decision-making weight within an inter-
national agency, then NATO is perhaps again an appropriate 
choice because of Washington's ascendancy in the alliance. At a 
time when the River Rhine is dying, the Baltic Sea and Lake Erie 
have become cesspools, air pollution chokes pedestrians in New 
York City and Lisbon, oil spills threaten the sands of Balboa Beach 
and the Amalfi Coast, the whale population approaches extinction 
and shellfish contain toxic levels of mercury and cyanide, urgency 
is a paramount consideration.5 Governments such as the United 
States which perceive this urgency should perhaps act where they 
are most accustomed to find compliance, in this case through a 
regional security pact. 
Despite the pressing question of burden-sharing within NATO 
(a question of who should share the burdens rather than of whether 
the burdens should be shared), the key problem of funding is still 
not so immediate in a defense pact as in other international orga-
nizations such as the United Nations. Under the aura of national 
security, additional appropriations can normally be found to fi-
nance buildings, equipment, and salaries for office staffs and re-
search personnel if the already substantial existing facilities (in 
Brussels, at the Defense College in Italy, and in the various affiliated 
research institutes throughout Europe) are deemed inadequate. In 
1968, for example, nearly 4.5 million NATO dollars went into sci-
entific research. 6 In fields as nascent as environmental engineering 
and as urgent as ecology, where vast monitoring networks are 
needed and where so much applied research is required, the fi-
nancial stature of NATO is compelling. 
But perhaps the most attractive aspect of NATO for the inter-
national environmental planners is its relatively small size (14 mem-
bers) that nevertheless includes most of the world's major polluters 
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and most of the nations with the technology to stop further degra-
dation. Just as George F. Kennan favored an elite club of advanced 
industrial states to fight pollution, so the Nixon administration 
apparently favored a tightly-knit regional grouping.7 
The motivation and objectives for the choice of NATO as an 
environmental institution are not, however, simple. The leader-
ship may indeed wish to plaster over cracks in the alliance created 
recently by disputes over the allocation of defense costS.8 If the 
members perceive a new common task to which they are com-
mitted, even France may once again acknowledge NATO's utility. 
If so, this would represent a victory for what Stanley Hoffman calls 
"high politics," a victory achieved by the functional expedient of 
"low politics" accompanied by favorable environmental side-
effects.9 Was the environmental issue exploited largely to save the 
alliance? Or was the alliance in fact a genuine first choice, among 
available international options, to save the environment? 
STRUCTURAL DEBITS 
Notwithstanding the President's enthusiasm for a solution in the 
context of the Alliance revealed in his Message to Congress on the 
Environment (February 8, 1971), one must recognize a number of 
weaknesses which afflict regional security pacts as social or welfare 
institutions. First, in spite of Article 2 of the NATO Charter which 
encourages "economic collaboration" and "well-being" among 
members, of the Report of the Three on Non-Military Co-opera-
tion, and of Articles 25-36 of the North Atlantic Council Com-
munique (Paris, 1957), NATO is largely an ad hoc military 
organization dependent upon a high degree of specialization for 
efficiency and reliability. What sets NATO apart from the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development or the Euro-
pean Economic Community is that the defense pact has a central 
military responsibility. If NATO tires to don both the worker's 
apron and the soldier's uniform, neither may fit. A problem of 
bigness already confronts the pact. Fragmentary, empirical evidence 
suggests that the amount of paper work, the number of sessions, and 
the strain on communications is growing at a much faster rate 
than the bureaucracy itself.1O To add tasks and functions to the 
bureaucracy is inevitably to reduce and impair the military effec-
tiveness of the organization. 
Second, and perhaps more serious, the "third dimension" con-
cept explicitly excludes the developing nations where a majority 
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of the world's population live and where the bulk of the wilderness 
areas and unspoiled coast lines remain relatively free of man's care-
lessness. If the purpose of resource conservation and a sustained 
quality of life is to help man, then environmental standards and 
programs of environmental education are most essential where man 
is most abundant, especially in Asia and Latin AmericaY More-
over, if a number of industrial processes such as strip mining and 
agricultural practices such as one-crop farming create virtually 
irreversible damage, then it would at the very least be callous for 
an international agency to set standards for the developed countries 
while in effect abetting abuses among the raw material producers 
which may be called upon to mine larger quantities of coal, for 
example, in lieu of foreign cut-backs induced by pollution restric-
tions.12 With only regional environmental solutions. additional 
pollution created by the flight of the dirty semi-manufactures from 
the more stringent controls of advanced industrial nations is likely 
to inundate the Third World. 
There is a strong possibility that NATO was selected in part so 
as to avoid the more complicated environmental problems of the 
developing areas. Ethical indignation apart, the policy of turning 
away from the developing world could become self-defeating in a 
pragmatic sense, destroying the last virgin areas which are a plea-
sure and a topic of study for tourists and natural scientists from 
the developed countries. Believing themselves exploited by exclu-
sionary regional environmental deals, otherwise cooperative Third 
World countries may in the future also raise the price of their 
participation in standard-setting and monitoring, if they participate 
at all. 
A possible counter-argument is that nations in the Third World 
have shown no alacritous interest in environmental protection. 
There can be no doubt that the opportunity costs of pollution con-
trols are greater in a country where millions starve than in coun-
tries where millions suffer from over-weight. But we must also 
remember that some types of pollution, e.g., problems of urban 
sewage, are as great in New Delhi as in New York; this could fur-
nish a stimulus for environmental reform on an international scale 
if the terms are rightY An international environmental agency has 
obligations to everyone, not just the systemic elite. And lack of 
information, or governmental inertia, is perhaps more an obstacle 
than poverty to cleaner surroundings-ecological awareness has 
been a recent thing in the United States. 
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Third, and conversely, one can question whether in the medium-
term a regional organization like NATO with primary military 
responsibilities can ever, in the last analysis, put environmental 
values against security sought through military operations. NATO 
automatically cuts itself off from cooperation with Communist 
nations on grounds which have nothing to do with air and water 
pollution. Soviet participation in the follow-up of the CCMS reso-
lution to end all deliberate oil discharges at sea by 1975, for in-
stance, occurred not in the original NATO conference on oil spills 
itself but only subsequently in the Maritime Safety Committee of 
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, an 
institution with a far broader scope of membership. Since environ-
mental politics is always sensitive and frequently subordinate to 
security or prestige aspects of international politics, environmental 
betterment must be removed from centers of unnecessary political 
tensions. The damage these tensions may cause is exemplified by 
the boycott of the East European nations at the U.N. Stockholm 
Convention on the environment (presaged by a similar partial boy-
cott at the Prague meeting a year earlier) over the exclusion of 
East Germany.14 Without the participation of East Germany, Po-
land and the Soviet Union, little can be achieved toward cleaning 
up the Baltic, to say nothing of the grosser impact of these tensions 
on collaboration elsewhere in the world. 
With NATO as environmentalist, ideological differences will 
find a focus in the very institution which seeks to negotiate pollu-
tion standards among states. The image of the security pact is 
coercive, while the image of environmental protection has been 
accommodating, although not always conciliatory. The training 
and personal Weltanschauung of the pact's administrators, if not 
contentious, are inward-looking and cautious rather than imagina-
tive and encompassing as demanded by the hovelty and global pur-
view of environmental degradation. In terms of purpose, diplomatic 
style, and scope of membership, NATO is not the ideal benefactor 
of nature. 
Fourth, much of the research undertaken on behalf of NATO is 
of necessity classified, creating all of the problems of security 
checks, bans on the publication of certain materials, restrictions on 
archival use, and prohibitions on communication or personal con-
tacts with scholars outside the Atlantic Community which scientists 
have learned to eschew. Combined with a natural proclivity to look 
at ecology in the narrow sense of industrial pollution because of the 
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particular limited focus of the members' interests, these impedi-
ments to unfettered research may lead to unfortunate scientific 
compromises. A mere 10 percent of the scientists invited to NATO 
congresses, for example, come from non-member nations. 15 As a 
military organization, moreover, NATO could hardly be expected 
to open its files on radiation exposure or meteorological patterns of 
fall-out to scholars, or indeed to allow scholars to publish materials 
which would endanger secrecy or damage the organization's 
prestige. 
The fifth and more general dilemma, more encompassing than 
the secrecy problem, is that of conflicts of interest. NATO-
sponsored environmental research may consciously or quite sub-
consciously come to emphasize projects of demonstrable military 
significance. NATO's behavioral science program is indicative. 
Begun in September of 1959 under the title "Advisory Group on 
Defense Psychology," it held conferences on topics largely of in-
terest to military psychologists during the period 1960-65. So 
weighted in this direction were its activities that the Group re-
ported to both the Science Committee and the Defense Group. 
Just as the United States Navy decided on security grounds to 
oppose placing whales on the endangered species list in 1970, so a 
regional defense pact will oppose environmental controls which 
threaten its particular security interests.16 
To avoid such conflicts within the federal government, the 
Nixon Administration withdrew environmental functions from the 
Departments of Interior, Agriculture and Commerce, among 
others, while centralizing these activities in a single governmental 
organ less compromised-the Environmental Protection AgencyP 
To practice the opposite policy at the international level suggests 
not so much hypocrisy but failure to think through the conse-
quences of this policy for the global effort to protect the biosphere. 
Sixth, one can ask whether global environmental protection can 
prosper in an agency as hierarchic as NATO. Is a multilateral strat-
egy of code termination more desirable than the monopolistic deci-
sion-making approach employed in the pact? According to the 
French military strategist Andre Beaufre, Americans "in all in-
nocence think of collaboration as a one-way street;" they "exert 
their leadership quite naturally without imagining for a moment 
that this kind of association is not 'democratic.' "18 No paucity of 
examples indicates the unrest of America's allies regarding her 
military dominance. Anthony Eden favored a "general staff" or 
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group of experts to advise member governments; deGaulle pro-
posed a big power "directorate" of the chiefs of state; the NATO 
Citizens Convention (January 1962) passed resolutions calling for 
a Parliamentarians Conference or an Atlantic Assembly in which 
the smaller nations would be more broadly represented. 19 As a 
palliative, the United States ultimately devised the mixed-manning 
of surface ships (MLF), which was, however, unacceptable to the 
Europeans in part because it left unresolved decision-making prob-
lems at the highest levels.2o Has this same pattern of dominance 
carried over into NATO's committee structure dealing with en-
vironmental matters? Empirical evidence in Tables I and II sug-
gests that this unfortunately is the case. 
The United States is a member of one-half (four) of the environ-
mental committees and chairs three. Even bearing in mind the 
reputation for United States ascendency in the alliance, the degree 
of United States dominance over environmental matters only be-
comes obvious in contrast to committee participation in other areas. 
On six major Parliamentarian Conference Committees (i.e., the 
Political, Military, Economic, Scientific and Technical, and Cul-
tural Affairs and Information Committees, and the Special Commit-
tee on Developing NATO Countries), United States participation 
averages 10 percent of the membership.21 Even the important Mili-
tary Committee records only a 12 percent United States participa-
tion level. Likewise, although the total United States delegation to 
NA TO is the largest, when one considers offiicals ranked according 
to grades on the International Staff, United States representation 
TABLE I 
NATO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMITTEES 
COMMITTEE Size Salience· Chairman Other Members 
Air Pollution 3 4 U.S. Tur., W.G. 
Open-Water Pollution 4 4 Belg. Port., Can., Fr. 
Inland "Water Pollution 4 4 Can. Fr., U.S., Belg. 
Scientific Knowledge 
and Decision-Making 3 W.G. 
Work Satisfaction in a 
Technological Era 2 U.K. 
Environment in the 
Strategy of Regional 
Development I 2 Fr. 
Road Safety I I U.S. 
Disaster Assistance Project 2 I U.S. Italy 
• Importance of committee coded in terms of centrality and scope of jurisdiction. (4) 
high; (3) moderately high; (2) average; (1) low. 
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TABLE II 
NATO INDEX OF COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
Committee Chairman 
Salience Salience 
Chairman Member Score Score Total 
United 
States 3 4 10 6 23 
France 1 3 10 2 16 
Canada 1 2 8 4 15 
Belgium 1 2 8 4 15 
West 
Germany 1 2 7 3 13 
Britain I 1 2 2 6 
Turkey 0 1 4 0 5 
Portugal 0 1 4 0 5 
Italy 0 1 1 0 2 
(about 10 percent of the total) is not shifted disproportionately 
towards the upper end.22 The United Kingdom, France, and Ger-
many all exceed the United States in representation. Thus, in 
contrast to the normal individual presence of American nationals 
on NATO committees, the average figure of 50 percent for the 
gross level of participation on the environmental committees is 
strikingly high. Whatever the proposals which emerge from these 
committees, they will not merely carry Washington's approval but 
are also likely to establish the kind of environmental standards 
which the United States believes the world should accept. 
When one considers committee salience, France, Canada, Bel-
gium and the Federal Republic of Germany do somewhat better. 
But the United States still chairs the crucial Committee on Air 
Pollution which, within NATO, alone develops quality standards 
and control techniques for such commercially sensitive pollutants as 
sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides. Since in most committee systems 
the chairmen wield unusual power, it is well to compare the envi-
ronmental with the general committees on this measure. On the 
average, the United States provides 13 percent of the chairmen 
for the North Atlantic Council Committees, a figure exceeded by 
the United Kingdom, France and the International Staff itself; this 
contrasts with 38 percent for the environmental committees.23 
Through membership on the Inland Water Committee, the United 
States can exercise influence over coastal as well as river basin 
management criteria wherever national jurisdiction is divided. By 
selecting control of one or two of the top committees in this way, 
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the United States is likely to possess far more authority than even 
the above data indicate. It is well known, for example, that much of 
United States administrative dominance in NATO stems from the 
authority of the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) 
and the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), positions 
which have never been occupied by a European. To be sure, habits 
of control are not easily relinquished. The possibility of similar 
American supremacy in environmental affairs is bound to create 
tensions. 
Two anomalies stand out. Great Britain participates far less than 
either the dimensions of her problems or her relative wealth would 
predict. Britain is the sole member on the Committee on Work 
Satisfaction in a Technological Era, a committee focusing upon the 
relationsihp between worker satisfaction and productivity, but one 
somewhat outside the main ecological current. On the other hand, 
Britain is not a member of the air pollution committee in spite of 
her smog experience in London, Manchester and other heavy in-
dustrial cities. The other anomoly is France since, despite her with-
drawal from the alliance (though not the treaty), she is a member 
of the Committees on Open-Water Pollution, Inland Water Pollu-
tion, and Environment in the Strategy of Regional Development. 
The reason for the massive French participation is not openly dis-
cussed, but it may stem from a desire to offset the American hege-
mony in international environmental affairs by getting an early 
start on the guidelines for later discussions affecting trade patterns, 
tariffs, and aid relationships. 
In general, from the perspective of the environment, NATO is 
an unsatisfactory administrative instrument whatever may have 
been the political motives of individual governments for the choice. 
The environmental issue must necessarily playa secondary role in 
the organization; too many governments are alienated or excluded 
from the membership; and the decision-making framework of the 
organization can quickly and dangerously become (because of 
the less compulsory character of environmental participation) a 
center of tensions observed again and again in the military sphere.24 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL BALANCE SHEET 
A significant policy decision awaits Washington in the wake of 
the 1972 Stockholm Conference. Where shall the United States 
place major international environmental emphasis? Is the NATO 
"third dimension" worth pursuing with additional increments of 
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funds and expanded research projects, including perhaps the ex-
ploration of enforcement criteria? Or is the U.N.-proposed envi-
ronmental agency involving some 54 nations and led by a smaller 
secretariat a far better functional alternative?25 
Because of NATO's structural debits, the latter agency may in 
the long-run be more acceptable internationally. The modest 100 
million dollar funding of the U.N.-sponsored agency, two-fifths of 
which the United States has elected to absorb over a five year period 
is, however, clearly insufficient.26 It is precisely on such questions 
as finance that Washington will have to choose between two very 
different, contending approaches to environmental protection. The 
situation resembles in microcosm the "guns plus butter" rationale 
of the early Vietnam War years. Resources are always limited for 
any given project even in an affluent democracy where, especially 
prior to elections, policy is flexible and where the margins of eco-
nomic choice are comparatively broad. If start-up costs are high and 
institutional expenditures must pass thresholds before genuine 
economies of scale are observed in research, monitoring activity, 
staff size and the potential for effective mediation, then progress 
has been decisively hampered where two similar programs are sup-
ported coincidently. To attempt to fund both is merely to pro-
crastinate while denying the better administrative solution ade-
quate resources and proper leadership. 
This appraisal is not alone in advocating a re-evaluation of the 
"third dimension" as the major international environmental fo-
rum. Brian Johnson has pointed out that European reactions to 
the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society have been "a 
good deal less than enthusiastic;" that NATO's membership covers 
a geographic area "that makes no sense in environmental terms;" 
and finally that there is no reason why the scientific findings of 
CCMS could not have been discussed "in another forum."27 Rich-
ard N. Gardner has long held that the "central machinery" for en-
vironmental cooperation must be global. "It was inappropriate," 
he argues, for the United States to make its "first concrete proposal 
[for international environmental collaboration] in NATO."28 
Enthusiasts of a larger environmental role for NATO may note 
that the activities of CCMS were essentially research-oriented pilot 
projects undertaken a"t a time when it was difficult to stimulate 
any international concern for ecological betterment. While the 
projects may at first have been research-oriented, talk of standard-
setting and monitoring is now current within NATO; and while 
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CCMS may have been considered by some a temporary expedient, 
it has gained stature and permanence rivaling subsequent pro-
posals.29 A kind of self-fulfilling prophecy adds momentum to such 
extensions of bureaucratic activity. Just as the creation of the MLF 
schema helped solidify belief in the alleged German desire for a 
"finger on the nuclear trigger," so a larger environmental role for 
NATO may foster a belief that the role is necessary and that better 
institutional options are unavailable.30 When the momentum of 
the prophecy finally stalls, the effect on international cooperation 
may be traumatic as was true for a time following the demise of 
the MLF. 
The issue is not whether regional environmental activity is ap-
propriate, because no one doubts this. The issue is whether NATO 
is a better forum than alternative regional bodies such as the 
OECD, the Council of Europe, or the V.N. regional economic 
commissions for discussion and negotiation of pollution standards.31 
Nor is the utility of CCMS research on oil spillage, for example, 
in doubt. It is the political framework which ultimately must urge 
acceptance of the research findings upon individual governments 
which is at issue. Even were the choice a regional organization de-
void of military or ideological potential for conflict, a division of 
labor would best be established between it and systems-wide institu-
tions such as the V.N .-sponsored environmental agency in order 
to prevent redundancy and bureaucratic competition. One of the 
easiest corporate escapes from domestic pollution controls occurs 
when jurisdictional disputes tie up environmental enforcement 
agencies. There is no reason to expect less procrastination emerging 
from similar quarrels at the international level. 
A possible mode of specialization to minimize this strife would 
channel three activities: (1) monitoring and data aggregation 
toward global organizations; (2) standard-setting and bargaining 
in the direction of non-defense-oriented regional organizations 
capable of achieving agreement within regions without jeopardiz-
ing future cooperation between regions; and (3) enforcement 
toward national governments within the administrative capacity 
to patrol their own borders and off-shore jurisdictions.32 Negotia-
tion of these functional areas of competence will be difficult enough 
without the unnecessary baggage of interregional military suspicion 
and accusation. While this institutional division of labor may be 
regarded as optimal from the viewpoint of the environmentalist, 
it may be less than ideal politically if military, status, or economic 
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demands carry greater weight. Forced by its primary military role 
to exclude the Soviet Union and Japan, the second and third largest 
industrial producers and polluters respectively, NATO's "third 
dimension" does not have a firm basis for generalized action; on 
the other hand, the North Atlantic countries have put status con-
siderations aside and shown some willingness to submit to United 
States environmental direction. . 
Given the desire by the Western leadership to test the NATO 
option or at least to hold it open for a time, in which areas might 
NATO concentrate, and what environmental strategy might it 
pursue? 
The technical skills which NATO staffs have learned in the 
military context, for instance cost/benefit analysis, operations re-
search procedures and data storage and retrieval, ought to find an 
ecological application. Insofar as the Organization focuses on 
problems largely internal to NATO countries such as air pollution 
over cities (e.g., the Ankara-Frankfurt air pollution study), inter-
regional complications can be minimized. Since the problems are 
essentially domestic, the solutions are not likely to have a negative 
political impact outside the region. International exchanges of 
data, patent information, and technical expertise can accelerate 
the search for solutions, but the solutions themselves are not in 
most cases dependent upon international cooperation with non-
aligned countries, nor are the technical solutions likely to damage 
political cooperation elsewhere. Truly international environmental 
problems such as the attempt to clean up the Baltic or the Mediter-
ranean are another matter, since Eastern European countries, 
Israel and the Arab nations are not likely to be pleased with po-
litical decisions about standards, notwithstanding the technical 
basis, which they have not helped to determine. 
Second, provided NATO adopts a strategy of generalized re-
search rather than standard-setting or enforcement, the Organiza-
tion can make an environmental contribution. If consultation 
with foreign experts and dissemination of the results is not hin-
dered, research funded by NATO on the decomposition of exhaust 
fumes or on the chemical catalysis of eutrophication would be of 
considerable international significance. When applied for example 
to an equitable settlement of pollution disputes involving the 
Danube Basin or to limitations on the production of the huge 
supersonic jet transports, however, the research acquires a policy 
focus which NATO is far less equipped to mediate. Standard-
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setting and enforcement will also be affected even within the At-
lantic community by the non-participation of the neutral states 
such as Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia which either act as a 
cause of, or become a target for, major international pollution. 
Most environmentalists will interpret these recommendations 
as "second-best," appropriate unfortunately to a less-than-optimal 
ecological instrument. Moreover, at a time when foreign reaction 
to United States environmental initiative is uneasy, tact and in-
genuity appear crucial. On issues in which diplomatic style, rhe-
torical tone, and merits were seminal, the United States often found 
itself in a "derisory minority" of two to a half-dozen governments 
at the 1972 Stockholm Conference.33 Further emphasis on the 
"third dimension" in the shadow of the new U.N. Secretariat for 
Environmental Affairs can only too easily give substance to private 
assertions of American "rigidity" and "arrogance," terms heard at 
Stockholm. 
There is a time for bold diplomatic action and, perhaps, a time 
for maneuver. In the present setting, could a delicate turn toward 
less Americanized environmental institutions better serve United 
States interests and the global community? 
Those who believe that NATO can become the primary inter-
national institution to defend man's environment clearly do not 
favor a re-orientation of American effort. They see the opportunity 
costs of loading NATO with environmental tasks as bearable, 
though burdensome. They accept the exclusion of the developing 
countries from decisions which inevitably affect the Third World 
and which to some degree depend upon its compliance ·as the price 
for efficiency, less inhibited action (at least in the North Atlantic 
area) and conclusive agreements. They downgrade the impact of 
secrecy, the military focus of research, and the effect of exclusionary 
membership on unfettered scientific dialogue. They disclaim that 
environmental activities will interfere with the essential military 
purpose of NATO, just as they doubt that that purpose overwhelms 
and subordinates environmental concern. In so arguing, they imply 
that the effort to stop pollution will not socialize the military 
bureaucracy toward a new consciousness, nor in contrast that the 
effort will tend to militarize social values underlying the environ-
mental movement. Finally, the advocates of the third dimension 
view the dominance of the United States in NATO not as a pres-
ence which in the medium-term is likely to stifle the processes of 
standard-setting, monitoring and enforcement, especially between 
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regions, but as leverage to pry less informed or less zealous govern-
ments into appropriate action. 
Which perspective is the valid one-the view on the one hand 
that NATO can supply a credible defense of clean air and water 
and a higher quality of life, or, on the other, the view that the 
machinery and purposes of military security are incompatible with 
environmental values? A hard look at institutional priorities con-
tinues to be in order while the process of commitment is still re-
versible. 
-.~.~~.­
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